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successfully stimulated through competitions. Efficiency, falling renewable costs and the 
carbon tax have almost completely driven coal out of the system. 
  
                                                 
1 Written as Chapter 5 for the Handbook on the Economics of Electricity,  eds. J-M. Glachant, P. 
Joskow and M. Pollitt. 
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1. The British Electricity Market 1947-89 
The British model has evolved to cover the island of Great Britain (England, Wales and 
Scotland), while Northern Ireland, part of the UK, has evolved into a quite different market 
model covering the island of Ireland in its Single Electricity Market (SEM). This chapter 
discusses the British market — its relationship to the SEM is discussed in Newbery (2017). 
The main emphasis here is on England and Wales, which experienced the main restructuring. 
Scotland had two vertically integrated regional state-owned utilities which retained their 
unbundled structure after privatization.  
Before restructuring and privatization in 1989-90, the state-owned Central Electricity 
Generating Board (CEGB) owned generation and transmission in England and Wales.  
Transmission and site location of new generation was coordinated by the CEGB, although the 
main high tension (440kV) grid had been largely completed by the 1960s with substantial 
spare capacity. Similarly, the intense period of building large power stations (with 660 MW 
turbines) was predicated on continued growth in demand of 8% p.a. that had come to an 
abrupt halt with the first oil shock. The stations under construction would deliver substantial 
excess capacity once completed. Distribution and supply (retailing) were managed by 12 
Area Boards, who paid the CEGB the Bulk Supply Tariff and set tariffs for their captive retail 
customers. 
The Bulk Supply Tariff (BST) evolved into a two-part fixed charge (base and peak) 
per kW, allocated on the basis of the Area Boards’ use of base and peak capacity of both 
transmission and generation. A variable energy charge was set equal to the marginal energy 
cost (varying between night time, shoulder and peak periods). With a growing nuclear share 
and large coal stations that cannot be rapidly stopped and started, the problem was excess 
capacity at night and excess demand at the peak. The solution was to build very costly 
pumped storage schemes and to introduce cheap rates for night-time electrical storage units, 
both storing either power or heat for later use. Meek (1968) compares this tariff structure with 
the theoretical ideal more closely followed in France (where Boiteux was both the theorist 
behind such tariffs and the head of EdF),4 foreshadowing the tariff problems created by high 
renewables penetration with similarly high fixed and very low variable costs. Trade with 
France was through balanced bilateral swaps designed to benefit from the one-hour difference 
in timing of peak demand. 
The CEGB’s performance had been strongly criticized for its inefficiency, particularly 
in delivering timely and cost-effective investment, and under-pricing its output (Henney, 
1994; Newbery and Green, 1996). After the success and lessons learned from earlier UK 
                                                 
2 Written as Chapter 5 for the Handbook on the Economics of Electricity,  eds. J-M. Glachant, P. 
Joskow and M. Pollitt. 
3 I am indebted to anonymous referees for the EPRG WP and Mike Waterson for helpful comments. 
4 Boiteux (1949) 
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utility privatizations, the CEGB was ripe for restructuring to create competitive wholesale 
and retail markets, and regulated transmission and distribution networks (Newbery, 2000). 
 
Figure 1:  UK Electricity Generation by Fuel, 1970-2017 
Source: BEIS (2018), DUKES (2018 ch. 5) 
Note: “other” is all thermal generation from other generators (i.e. not the public supply 
companies), non-CCGT gas and thermal renewables. Pumped storage (net negative) is not 
shown, but (small) amounts of annual average exports are shown negative. NETA is the new 
Electricity Trading Arrangements, EMR is Electricity Market Reform, both discussed below 
2. Privatization, restructuring and market power 
The CEGB was restructured in 1989 to separate transmission and generation. The 12 Area 
Boards became Regional Electricity Companies with temporary ownership of National Grid. 
The networks were subject to price-cap regulation by the Office of Electricity Regulation, 
Offer.  All were privatized in 1990 with the exception of Nuclear Electric that was finally 
sold in 1995. The vertically integrated Scottish companies were privatized unrestructured in 
1991.  
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the fuel mix from 1970 (after the shift from coal to oil 
in the 1960s). By 1989, just before restructuring for privatization, around 90% of the 
conventional thermal generation was from coal, 7% from oil and the remainder largely from 
industrial by-product gases. The share of oil rapidly fell to 1% in 2002. After privatization, 
the coal share declined as imported electricity and nuclear power increased. It declined more 
rapidly with the ‘dash for gas’, which was all new build gas-fired Combined Cycle Gas 
Turbines (CCGTs) despite the considerable spare existing capacity. 
The market structure of generation in England and Wales was initially highly 
concentrated in two price-setting fossil companies, National Power and PowerGen. The state-
owned Nuclear Electric (whose eight modern stations were privatized in 1995 and 
Generation supplied by fuel 1970-2017
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restructured in 1996 to become British Energy, leaving the old Magnox stations in British 
Nuclear Fuels LTd, BNFL in figure 2) was a price-taking base-load company. National 
Power was structured (as “BigGen”) to be large enough to carry the risks of owning the 
nuclear power stations, whose performance had been poor and whose accounts were opaque. 
PowerGen (“Little Gen”) was two-thirds as large to provide a sufficient counterweight to 
National Power. The city baulked at underwriting the unknown risks of the nuclear stations, 
so the nuclear stations were pulled out of National Power and kept in state ownership. By 
then it was too late to choose a better market structure. Henney (1987) had argued for 
breaking the CEGB into 10 companies (there were 10 large coal-stations), while Green and 
Newbery (1992) argued that five companies would have created a workably competitive 
structure, a conclusion endorsed by the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA, 2016) in 
their study of the six large energy companies selling electricity and gas. 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the market structure in England and Wales from a de-
facto price-setting duopoly to a competitive structure just before the 2001 New Electricity 
Trading Arrangements (NETA) were imposed.  
 
Figure 2 Output by company in England and Wales 
Source: National Grid, Seven-year statements, various years5 
 
All generators (above 50MW) offered plant into the Electricity Pool day ahead, 
specifying the prices and quantities for each unit, which the System Operator used to 
determine the unconstrained System Marginal Price (SMP, the price of the last plant 
accepted). Market power allowed the two companies to game the Pool and exploit capacity 
constraints that had been efficiently managed under the CEGB’s central dispatch. Constraint 
                                                 
5 These have been superseded by National Grid, Electricity Ten Year Statements, available: 
https://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/publications/electricity-ten-year-statement-etys  
England and Wales capacity by owner, 1990-2002
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costs rose rapidly, until National Grid as System Operator convinced Offer to provide 
incentives for their better management (although they remained higher than necessary). 
Newbery and Pollitt (1997) concluded that the way the CEGB had been privatized to 
unbundle generation and transmission combined with an open-access wholesale market (the 
electricity Pool) created substantial value (equal to a permanent cost reduction of 6%) but that 
the benefits were more than appropriated by the new owners of the generation assets. In 
Scotland, vertical integration appeared to obstruct any efficiency gains, and consumers (and 
tax payers) lost to the owners of the new companies (Pollitt, 1998; Domah and Pollitt, 2001). 
The lesson was clear, privatization without restructuring to introduce competition was not 
necessarily beneficial, and an imperfectly competitive structure prevented efficiency gains 
being passed through to consumers. It would have been better to introduce competition before 
privatization and avoid the lengthy regulatory struggles and the fortunate arrival of cheap 
gas-fired stations to slowly rectify that mistake. 
The consequences of market structure on electricity prices have been elegantly teased 
out by Sweeting (2007) and illustrated in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3 Wholesale electricity and fuel costs, 1990-2014 and market concentration 
Source: : NGC Seven Year Statements, various years, and data from J Bower and C 
Humphries (Bower, 2002) 
HHI,6 the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, is shown for the price-setting coal stations. 
The first period 1990-94 was one in which NP and PG were privatized with sales contracts 
with the Regional Electricity Companies (RECs) and purchase contracts for coal from the 
state-owned National Coal Board, giving revenue and cost certainty needed for their sale 
prospectuses. Contract cover mitigates market power (Allaz and Vila, 1993, Newbery, 1995), 
but as the contracts fell away, the price-cost margin rose, restrained only by the threat of a 
monopoly inquiry. In 1994, to avoid a reference to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 
NP and PG agreed a price control with Offer, to last until they had divested 6 GW of their 20 
GW of coal plant to Eastern TXU, shown in figure 2. The sale came with an “earn-out” 
charge of £6/MWh, ostensibly to cover the cost of the sulphur permits that went with the 
                                                 
6 The HHI is the sum of the squared market shares in percentages, with 10,000 a perfect monopoly, 
5,000 a symmetric duopoly and above 1800 indicating significant market power. 
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stations sold (Newbery, 2005), but raising costs to Eastern TXU causing it to set the 
wholesale price much of the time. This allowed the three companies to maximise their profits, 
as the original duopolists could hide behind Eastern. 
Before 1998 the duopolists were blocked from buying the supply businesses from the 
distribution companies. In 1998 the Government allowed vertical integration to take place in 
exchange for further divestment and ending the “earn-out” clause (Newbery, 2005). Sweeting 
(2007) characterises this period as one of tacit collusion, in which National Power and 
PowerGen aimed to sustain the wholesale price as market concentration rapidly fell with 
divestment. Arguably National Power (which became Innogy in October 2000) and 
PowerGen played a long game in which the original quasi-referral by Offer with a price cap 
and divestment demonstrated their ability to sustain market power, followed by a 
demonstration that divesting plants if anything increased their price-cost margin. This 
encouraged new entrants to buy old coal stations to diversify their plant mix (British Energy, 
the nuclear power company, having failed to buy a supply company (a more sensible hedge) 
bought a coal station instead (Taylor, 2007). High price-cost margins convinced potential 
buyers of their profitability, ensuring a high price for such plant. Buying retail businesses 
allowed generating companies to hedge internally against wholesale price movements, a 
strategy that Nuclear Electric tried and failed to follow, with subsequent disastrous results as 
it subsequently went into administration (Taylor, 2007).7 Internal hedges reduce wholesale 
market liquidity that deters entry of competitive retailers, leading Ofgem8 (eventually) to 
encourage all sales to be transacted through a (moderately) transparent wholesale market. 
3. Competition and the switch to an energy-only market 
As divestment created lower concentration, the structure evolved towards the current “Big 
Six” generation plus retailing companies.9 As the new buyers started competing (believing 
somewhat naively that they could raise their plant load factors from 20-40% without 
impacting price) so Figure 3 shows the wholesale price collapsed and the market finally 
became workably competitive, albeit in the face of quite wildly fluctuating fuel prices.  
Before that price collapse, however, Offer remained concerned about the persistence 
of market power in the wholesale market, despite all the divestment. To address that, it 
pressed to abolish the Pool and replace it by a bilateral energy-only market termed the New 
Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA). Generators would have to contract with buyers to 
submit a balanced physical position to the System Operator by Gate Closure (an hour before 
dispatch). The argument, noted above, was that fully contracting removes the incentive to 
manipulate the spot market. To encourage full contracting, imbalances were settled through 
the Balancing Mechanism (not a market) at penal buy or sell prices (depending whether the 
agent was short or long). This was enthusiastically accepted by the Big Six who were now 
vertically integrated. They were effectively already hedged internally with little need to trade 
                                                 
7 Nuclear Electric also imprudently bought one of the divested coal stations, and along with other 
buyers suffered a 50% loss in value after a few months when wholesale prices collapsed. 
8 Offer became Ofgem, the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets, in 1999. 
9   The Six Large Energy Firms are Centrica (originally a gas monolist), SSE plc, RWE npower, 
E.ON, Scottish Power and EdF Energy (who bought the nuclear stations from the bankrupt British 
Energy). 
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bilaterally, while the illiquidity of such trading over the counter and the penal Balancing 
Mechanism helpfully deterred entry. Newbery (1998) criticised the proposed reforms then 
under discussion, while Bower (2002), Evans and Green (2003) and Newbery (2005) argued 
that by 2001 they were redundant because of the pre-existing development of competition. 
Ofgem estimated that market participants could incur total costs of up to £580 million in 
implementing NETA over the first 5 years.10 In a careful econometric study, Giulietti et al. 
(2010) examined the impact of NETA on final consumer prices, which include retail margins 
and other (unchanged) costs in addition to wholesale prices. They find a sharp increase in the 
retail margins in England and Wales compared to Scotland (where NETA was not introduced 
until later), strongly suggesting that NETA raised retail margins. The new market design 
made entry by retailers lacking generation much riskier as they now had no Pool reference 
price on which to contract. 
It has taken nearly 400 modifications to make the Balancing Mechanism fit for 
purpose and closer to a single price balancing market.11 It took a further major reform of the 
electricity market in the Energy Act 2013 (HoC, 2013) to restore a capacity market and 
address other market failures (Newbery, 2012, 2016). The resulting Energy Market Reform 
(EMR in fig. 1) made the market reasonably efficient in the eyes of the Competition and 
Markets Authority (CMA, 2016). After over a decade some of the virtues of the original Pool, 
with its single price, liquidity for contracting, ease of entry, and a scarcity element in the 
form of a capacity payment were once again realised (Grubb and Newbery, 2018). 
 
4. Pools, central dispatch, capacity payments or energy-only markets? 
The CEGB was centrally dispatched, and the newly restructured market design in England 
and Wales retained central dispatch (using the CEGB’s dispatch algorithm) but created a Pool 
with a capacity payment. The logic of this structure was sound for a competitive market. The 
efficient wholesale price is the sum of the System Marginal Cost (SMC) plus a Capacity 
Payment, CP, where 
CP = LoLP*(VoLL-SMC).     (1) 
This can be rearranged to give the total price as  
Price = (1-LoLP)*SMC + LoLP*VoLL.     (2) 
The first term in (2) is the energy price assuming adequate capacity, which applies a 
fraction (1-LoLP) of the  time, while the second part is the rationing value to consumers 
when there is inadequate capacity, occurring a fraction LoLP of the time. The wholesale price 
would be efficient if, as in the All-Island SEM, generators were required to bid their marginal 
cost, but not in the duopoly market of the early Pool. Instead the price in (2) is determined by 
the System Marginal Price, possibly considerably above SMC.  
                                                 
10 https://www.nao.org.uk/report/the-new-electricity-trading-arrangements-in-england-and-wales/  
11 https://www.elexon.co.uk/change/modifications/?show=all  
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The capacity payment was paid to all plant declared available the day ahead but the 
duopoly gamed this by withdrawing plant day ahead to increase scarcity and hence the LoLP 
and capacity payment, then declaring them available to collect the manipulated capacity 
payment (Newbery, 2005). Offer responded to this blatant manipulation by not including any 
unavailable plant in the calculation of LoLP for the next 8 days (even if the plant were 
genuinely unavailable and caused scarcity). This market manipulation strengthened Offer’s 
resolve to abolish capacity payments, which it did in the 2001 move to the energy-only 
market of NETA. Under NETA owners decided whether or not to make plant available, were 
responsible for finding buyers, and if operating, were required to make offers and bids into 
the Balancing Mechanism, which the TSO would use to balance the system after gate closure. 
Fig 1 shows that after the massive entry of gas-fired CCGTs and the improved 
availability of nuclear power, the market had a large reserve margin. This is further 
exemplified in fig. 4, which gives plant load (capacity) factors from 1989/90. Nuclear 
availability increased after privatization, but fell soon after it went into administration in 2002 
before an eventual resale to EdF in 2009. Both coal and CCGT were well below their auction 
derating factors of 88%.12 The balance between coal and gas output was driven by relative 
fuel and, later, carbon prices. 
 
Figure 4 Plant load factors by fuel type 1997-2017 
Source: DUKES, various years 
Capacity payments would have been redundant in an oversupplied market, as the 
LoLP would remain close to zero all the time, but as the decade after NETA wore on, 
concerns over the life expectancy of aging coal and nuclear plant emerged, strengthened by 
                                                 
12 Plant offering into the capacity auction (discussed below) is de-rated to reflect its expected 
availability in stress periods. Actual availability will be lower to allow for scheduled maintenance. 
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tightening emissions controls under first the EU Large Combustion Plant Directive and then 
the Industrial Emissions Directive and the perceived difficulty of life extensions for the 
nuclear fleet. . It was expected that some 12 GW of the older coal-fired plant (about 20% of 
peak demand) would close by 2015 and an additional 6.3 GW of nuclear plant by 2016. In the 
event nuclear plant was granted life extensions so that at the end of 2017 nuclear capacity 
was 9.36 GW compared to 9.91 GW at the end of 2013 (DUKES, 2018, Table 5.7). 
An energy-only market might address this looming scarcity if everyone were 
confident that future generators would be allowed to extract scarcity value in tight periods, 
and that all investment in new capacity were based on the same expectations and relied on the 
same wholesale price. Without futures markets to lock-in such scarcity prices, and knowing 
the political pressures to restrain high prices, it must be doubtful that an energy-only market 
would deliver adequate reliability.  
In addition, the UK had signed up to a challenging share of renewable energy under 
the EU’s Renewables Directive (2009/28/EC).13 Variable energy sources such as wind and 
solar PV require considerably more flexible controllable (effectively fossil) plant to maintain 
security of supply. The aging stock of large coal plant and first generation CCGTs would be 
inadequate, requiring new investment. However, the British electricity market was 
uninvestible—prices would not cover fixed costs, futures markets to signal future higher 
scarcity prices were lacking, and Government energy policy was in disarray, with three 
Energy White Papers published between 2003-2007. In 2008, the UK Climate Change Act 
200814 was passed to provide the legal framework for ensuring that Government meets its 
climate change commitments. The electricity sector would bear the brunt of decarbonization, 
mostly through renewables (nuclear power was lagging and seen as excessively expensive). 
Renewables support policy oscillated between auctioned contracts in the 1990s, to a premium 
payment under the Renewables Obligation Scheme and small-scale Feed-in Tariffs. All 
(except the overly generous Feed-in Tariffs, FiTs) under-delivered relative to target. 
Investors, looking at the price-depressing effects of massive renewables in Germany (Hirth, 
2018) and concerned that the UK Government would need to accelerate its renewables 
programme, were increasingly concerned about the profitability of any conventional 
generation investment. 
The wide range of criticisms (notably from Ofgem, 2010) that the market was not 
likely to deliver secure, sustainable and affordable electricity finally provoked the 
Government to publish a White Paper (DECC, 2011). That set out an intellectually coherent 
basis for electricity market reform. After extensive consultation and Parliamentary debate, 
this package was finally enacted as the Energy Act 2013, (HoC, 2013). 
The lack of a credible carbon price would be addressed by a Carbon Price Floor, 
enacted by HM Treasury in the Budget in March 2011. Fossil fuel used to generate electricity 
would be taxed (through the Carbon Price Support, CPS) to bring the minimum price of CO2 
up to £16/tonne in 2013, rising linearly to £30/tonne in 2020, and projected to rise to 
                                                 
13 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32009L0028:EN:NOT.  
14 https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/27/contents.  
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£70/tonne by 2030 (all at 2009 prices).15  As any tax (such as the CPS) could be changed at 
each Budget, the commitment to decarbonizing was underpinned by an Emissions 
Performance Standard of 450gm/kWh “at base load” (i.e. averaged over the year and 
effectively a cap per kW of capacity), for any new plant, set to rule out any new coal stations 
without Carbon Capture and Storage capability. This is discussed below in §4.2. 
In order to accelerate renewables investment and to lower its cost by de-risking 
revenue streams, the Renewables Obligation Scheme would be phased out and replaced by a 
Contract-for-Difference support (described as a CfD with FiT). A CfD offers a guaranteed 
(and price-indexed) strike price for 15 years, with the holder receiving (or paying) the 
difference between a reference day-ahead market price and the strike price. In contrast to a 
standard CfD that specifies the volume on which the payments are made, this would apply to 
the actual delivery to the grid (hence it had FiT-like characteristics). The question of how best 
to support renewables will be addressed in §5. 
The final element was a capacity payment, marking an end to the energy-only market 
that the EU had contemporaneously set out in the EU Third Package. The Target Electricity 
Model (European Parliament, 2009) came into effect in 2014. A capacity auction for 
unsupported plant (i.e. existing and new fossil generation) would determine the payment 
required to make new investment financeable, or to keep existing plant operating. New entry 
would have 15-year contracts, existing plant a one-year contract (major refurbishments could 
claim a 3-year contract). The case for a capacity payment is that it addresses both a “missing 
money” and a “missing market” problem (Newbery, 2016). The lack of sufficiently far 
forward futures markets to sell electricity makes revenue streams at the mercy of unstable 
energy policies that can undermine the market (e.g. renewables targets and support). Without 
adequate remuneration for the new flexibility services needed by massive renewable 
penetration there can be a missing money problem as well, although this terminology has 
normally pointed to the problems of price-capped markets 
4.1 The GB Capacity Market 
The Capacity Market offers 15-year Capacity Agreements for new plant provided they have 
connected their plant by the start of the electricity year (April-March), four years after the 
auction at the T-4 auction held in December. The successful plant must be available for 
dispatch in “stress” periods announced four hours ahead, with penalties for failures to connect 
or deliver. Existing plant could also bid into the same auction, and receive the same clearing 
price, but only for the first year, or they could wait until the T-1 auction held one year ahead 
of delivery. The auction was designed after careful study of the US experience, and was a 
pay-as-clear descending clock auction with a single price for the whole of GB (despite the 
presence of a potentially significant constraint on the Scottish border). The issue of the 
interaction of transmission constraints and capacity payments will be considered further 
below. 
The auction was expected to clear at the net Cost of New Entry (CoNE) of £49/kWyr 
(based on a new CCGT and net of all the other revenue earned in energy and ancillary service 
                                                 
15 HM Treasury, Budget 2011, HC 836, March 2011. The intention was to move towards a carbon 
price that would make it possible to claim that new nuclear power would not be subsidized. 
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markets). The auction demand schedule has a kink at the target capacity to procure at this 
level, and a cap of 1.5 x net CoNE, reaching zero 1.5 GW above target. Existing plant cannot 
bid higher than 0.5 x net CONE without obtaining an exemption. National Grid as System 
Operator was charged with determining the amount of capacity to procure needed to meet the 
Government’s reliability standard of three hours Loss of Load Expectation (LoLE, averaged 
over many years),16 and to advise the Minister who makes the final decision (see e.g. 
National Grid, 2014). 
The relationship between the security standard and the VoLL is symmetric, in that if 
capacity investment decisions are based on revenues determined by (1) and the VoLL is pre-
determined, then the resulting capacity will give rise to a LoLE. Zachary and Wilson (2015) 
show that the optimal capacity to procure is such that LoLE =  net CONE/VoLL. As National 
Grid estimated net CONE at £49/kWyr and LoLE was required to be 3 hrs/yr, the required 
VoLL is £17/kWh. The Government also commissioned studies of the VoLL from London 
Economics (2013), a report that rather undermined the required VoLL of £17/kWh. A more 
plausible and lower value of VoLL would argue for a less reliable standard. The Single 
Electricity Market of the island of Ireland has a LoLE of 8hrs/yr and a VOLL of about 
€12/kWh, although a higher net CONE of €74.12/kWyr in 2017, again roughly internally 
consistent.17 
The Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) responsible for managing 
EMR and the capacity auction appointed an independent Panel of Technical Experts (PTE) to 
comment on the SO’s analysis of the amount to procure.18 They noted (DECC, 2014) that 
there is a bias towards over-procurement, in that the SO stands accountable if “the lights go 
out” but does not pay for the capacity, while the minister wishes to avoid newspaper 
headlines predicting blackouts resulting from his decision. Newbery and Grubb (2015) set out 
the argument in more detail. 
The first auction appeared to be highly successful in that it cleared at £19.40/kWyr 
(40% of the estimated net CoNE). The success was short-lived as the major entrant was a 
firm offering two large CCGTs (total 1.6 GW) failed to secure funding and shortly thereafter 
withdrew (leading to DECC increasing in the penalty for failure to build). The PTE had also 
criticized the analysis for assuming no contribution from interconnectors, despite many 
reports commissioned by the Government claiming that interconnectors contributed to 
security of supply. Arguably the failure to include their contribution more or less balanced 
out the exit of the CCGTs. Shortly thereafter the European Commission (DG COMP) 
required interconnectors to be allowed to bid into the capacity auction. Interconnectors were 
successful in the Early 2018/19 auction, held to remedy the exit of the CCGTs. Grubb and 
Newbery (2018) describe the results of the first six capacity auctions in more detail. 
The other entrants were small gas or diesel reciprocating engines (average size 10 
MW) connecting to the distribution networks, rather than the high tension grid. They 
                                                 
16 Compare the former CEGB’s standard of disconnecting some consumers in three winters over a 100 
years, decided in 1962 (Bates and Fraser, 1974, p122). The annual LoLE is the sum of the LoLP’s in 
each hour over the year. 
17 See www.sem-o.com/.../SEM-17-074%20ACPS%202018%20Decision%20paper%20.pdf  
18 The author was then a member of the Panel of Technical Experts but writes here in his personal 
capacity, drawing only on published material. 
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depressed the auction clearing price as they received a distorted “embedded benefit” as the 
avoided payment to the transmission grid of local connections. Almost all this payment was 
to recover the fixed costs of the transmission grid, rather than the avoided cost of actually 
using the network. This avoided payment of about £50/kWyr giving distribution-connected 
generation an effective capacity payment of £70/kWyr rather than £20/kWyr for 
transmission-connected plant. It took the regulator, Ofgem, three years to remove this 
“embedded benefit” payment.19 
Just as the capacity auctions appeared to be bedding down as an efficient and credible 
way of procuring the right kind of capacity to deliver reliability and flexibility, the EU’s 
General Court annulled the earlier EC decision to approve the GB Capacity Market on 15 
November 2018.20 In 2014 Tempus Energy complained that the auctions failed to give equal 
treatment to new investment to deliver demand-side response (DSR) by denying them the 15-
year indexed contract offered to generation. The UK Government had little choice but to 
suspect all capacity payments and the 2018 December auction until the legal position is 
clarified, which may require DG ENER to conduct a satisfactory investigation of the 
treatment of DSR, or the discrimination is removed. The island of Ireland had avoided this 
asymmetry and to date has been allowed to continue its capacity auctions. 
 
4.2 Climate change policy: budgets and the carbon price support 
The UK has taken a lead on climate change mitigation, driven in part by dissatisfaction with 
the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS). The ETS seemed systemically unable to deliver an 
adequate, credible and durable carbon price to guide the required low-carbon and very 
durable power sector investments needed to meet the EU’s 2050 carbon targets. In 2008, the 
UK Parliament passed the Climate Change Act 2008 (HC, 2008), which sets legally binding 
carbon targets, the latest of which, the Fifth Carbon Budget (CCC, 2015) for 2028-32 
commits the UK to reduce emissions by 57% from 1990. In the electricity sector the main 
instruments for delivering the target has been the Carbon Price Floor (CPF) described above, 
which is implemented by announcing in autumn budgets the Carbon Price Support (CPS) — 
an additional carbon tax on fuels burned in power stations that is added to the EU ETS 
Allowance price. Figure 5 shows the  CPF, the EUA price, the CPS, and their sum, shown as 
the GB price, all in nominal prices.21 
The carbon prices and the original planned trajectory of the CPF are shown in 
nominal terms, and illustrate the dramatic effect of the implementation of the EU Market 
Stability Reserve (MSR) in November 2017 (European Council, 2017). The MSR cancels 
surplus allowances from 2023 and makes carbon reductions more attractive, driving up the 
EUA price (Newbery et al., 2018). The GB carbon price for electricity is now at or above the 
original CPF, although how long the CPS will remain at its current, now quite high level, will 
                                                 
19 At https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/embedded-benefits-impact-assessment-
and-decision-industryproposals-cmp264-and-cmp265-change-electricity-transmission-charging-
arrangements-embedded-generators  
20 https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/p1_1442288/en/ 
21 The CPF oinly applies to GB, as Northern Ireland was granted an exemption to avoid distorting the 
Single Electricity Market of the island of Ireland. 
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depend both on the evolution of the EUA price and Britain’s future role in EU climate change 
policy. 
The effect of the CPS has been dramatic, moving coal plant from being the cheapest 
and hence running on base-load, to more costly than all but the oldest CCGTs. Figure 1 
shows the resulting decline in coal, which fell from 41% in 2013 to 8% in 2018. The CPS 
also raises the price of electricity in GB, by roughly £15.7/MWh when coal is setting the 
price and by £6/MWh if CCGTs set the price, making imports more attractive. Thus if coal 
were at the margin 60% of the time and gas 30% of the time, the price might rise by 
£11/MWh, although competition from abroad might reduce that somewhat. 
 
 
Figure 5 Evolution of the European Allowance (EUA) price for 1 tonne CO2 and CPF 
Source: EEX 
ETS and GB CO2 prices, 2011-18
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Figure 6 GB exports and imports with SEM (both Moyle and East-West interconnector) 
Source: Elexon 
 
As GB was already mostly importing electricity over its interconnectors to The 
Netherlands and France, the CPS merely made this even more attractive, but figure 6 shows 
that before the CPS reached its current level of £18/t CO2, GB was mainly exporting to the 
Single Electricity Market of the island of Ireland, as their fuel prices were higher than in GB. 
After the March 2015 rise in the CPS, prices in GB normally exceeded those in the SEM, 
reducing exports and increasing imports (from their previous very low level). 
Chyong, Guo and Newbery (2019) have studied the impact of the GB CPS in depth, 
looking at its impact in reducing emissions in the short run, as well as the emissions 
reductions from wind in the short and long run. They find that an extra 1 MWh of wind 
output resulting from a long run increase in wind capacity reduces coal output by 0.63 MWh 
and gas (CCGT) output by 0.37 MWh, leading to a saving of 0.68 t CO2 when the CPS is 
£18/t CO2 and fuel prices were those of 2016. If instead there had been no CPS and just the 
EUA price of £6/t CO2, coal would fall by 0.32 MWh, gas by 0.67 MWh and emissions by 
0.51 t CO2 in response to 1 MWh of wind. 
 
5 Supporting renewables: successes and remaining problems 
Newbery (2016b) sets out a brief history of UK renewable electricity policy, which has come 
almost full circle since 1989 when the industry was privatized. At that date the Government 
imposed a Fossil Fuel Levy on fossil generation to finance nuclear decommissioning. The 
European Commission insisted that this support be made available to all zero-carbon 
generation, including renewables. A Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO) was placed on 
electricity supply companies in the Electricity Act 1989, requiring them to buy a certain 
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amount of nuclear or renewable electricity at a premium price. Support for renewables was 
provided through NFFO auctions for effectively Feed-in Tariffs (FiTs) (Mitchell, 2000). 
The early NFFO auctions demonstrated their power of price discovery and 
competition in driving down costs and prices, although later the winner’s curse (combined 
with the absence of any penalties for failure to deliver) led to under-procurement and 
disillusionment. The auctioned FiT contracts were replaced in the Utilities Act 2000, which 
changed the NFFO price obligation into a quantity obligation. Renewables would be given a 
form of Premium FiTs, called Renewables Obligation Certificates (ROCs). The amount 
suppliers had to procure is set annually and shortfalls are charged at a penalty rate, the 
revenue from which is recycled to augment the value of ROCs. The value of ROCs varies 
somewhat with supply and demand, although they can be banked, reducing their variability. 
The main problem in financing renewables is that the future price of electricity, on top of 
which the ROC value is added, is itself highly volatile, and hard to hedge more than a year or 
two ahead. In contrast to gas-fired generation, which by setting the price has a natural hedge, 
renewables are exposed to the full price volatility. 
As noted above, the Energy Act 2013 phased out ROCs, to be replaced by CfDs which 
required all but small scale renewables to be marketed at the wholesale price. They receive a 
top-up equal to the excess of the announced strike price over a reference market price (or, if 
the market price is above the strike price, the developer has to pay back the excess). This 
exposes renewables to imbalance risk, although they can avoid that by contracting with other 
utilities at a discount on the contract price. 
Initially, the strike price was set administratively, but the Panel of Technical Experts in their 
first report (DECC, 2014) criticized the high strike prices for the 15-year renewables 
contracts. That, amplified by pressure from the EU Commission’s concerns over State Aids, 
led to periodic auctions. Newbery (2016b) estimated the resulting clearing prices for on-shore 
wind lowered the cost of financing investments (their Weighted Average Cost of Capital or 
WACC) by 3% real. In the mean-time the Government had won an election with a promise to 
remove support for the now remarkably competitive on-shore wind (Grubb and Newbery, 
2018). Subsequent auctions have excluded on-shore wind and solar PV, but auctions for off-
shore wind resulted in even more dramatic cost reductions. Prices fell from an administered 
price of £155/MWh for the first off-shore wind farm, to £120/MWh in the Round 1 auction 
(East Anglia One, 714 MW, delivery 2020), and then to £57.50/MWh in Round 2 (Hornsea 
II,  1,386 MW, delivery 2022). Figure 7 shows the countries that have added the largest 
amounts of renewable generation by output since 2006, where the UK is second behind 
Germany. 
16 
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Figure 7 EU Renewable generation added since 2006 
Source: Eurostat 
While the auctions for all technologies, and the commitment to offshore wind in 
particular, have delivered remarkable cost reductions, the form of support that raises output 
prices has distorted location decisions. A better solution would be to run an auction for the 
premium to be paid for the first 20,000 (or 30,000) full operating hours (MWh/MW installed 
capacity). This would provide an investment subsidy (as required by the EU Clean Energy 
Package22) for the purchase and installation of the renewable source. It would direct support 
to the source of the learning spill-overs that arise from the development, manufacture and 
installation, and not from subsequent operation. The subsidy design requires the plant to 
operate successfully to secure the full subsidy, but pays for the electricity generated at its 
value (which might require adjustment if the carbon price is below its correct level). The 
present payment per MWh amplifies the apparent advantage of locating in windy (or sunny) 
locations, even where these incur higher transmission costs. Locating wind farms in Scotland 
has resulted in a huge increase in costly offshore grid investments. These offshore 
“bootstrap” connections might, under the original incremental cost formula for determining 
transmission charges, have doubled the charges for North Scotland generation (including 
wind) but the published tariffs have hardly changed from 2017/18 (before the Western 
Bootstrap was commissioned in March, 2018) to 2019/20. 
Another criticism is that each EU Member State supports renewables within its 
territory, rather than where it could be delivered most cost-effectively. A more efficient use 
of resources would be for each Member State to contribute an agreed sum (e.g. as percent of 
GDP, per MWh consumed, or per tonne CO2 released) to a fund. This would hold EU-wide 
competitive auctions (perhaps with a share designated for R&D) to deliver the learning 
                                                 
22 COM/2016/0860 final at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1481278671064&uri=CELEX:52016DC0860  
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benefits at least cost. It would be hard to secure political consent for this, as it touches on tax 
and finance, always sensitive issues. The out-turn in which Germany has led the way and 
made major contributions to cost-reductions could also be defended, although the cost to 
German consumers has been considerable. A more efficient support system might have 
resulted in less capacity built to meet the output target, which would have created less 
learning spill-over, but if these spill-overs had been recognised, it might have led to more 
ambitious targets and support. 
 
6. Regulation: successes and problems 
Transmission and distribution networks are natural monopolies and as such need regulation if 
they are to be owned by profit-maximizing private utilities (Newbery, 2000). The UK 
pioneered price-cap regulation with the privatization of BT, the state-owned telephone 
monopoly. The regulator sets a base-weighted price index for the various goods and services 
offered, indexed to the Retail Price Index, Pt, but subject to a productivity improvement at 
rate X – hence the short-hand RPI-X. Armstrong et al. (1994) describes this in more detail and 
provides the rationale for the price basket. Thus for product j the price pjt and the resulting 
quantity sold, qjt, at date t years after the price control at date 0 must satisfy 
Σpjtqj0 ≤ Σpj0qj0(Pt/(P0(1+X)t)).                           (3) 
In addition, and especially important for capital-intensive network utilities, the regulator has a 
duty to ensure that efficiently incurred investment is properly remunerated, so that banks and 
shareholders are willing to finance the planned investment. This is done by starting with an 
initial Regulatory Asset Base or Value (RAB0) to which is added the approved investment, It 
at date t, and deducting the depreciation, Dt, to give the updated RAB:  
RABt = RAB0 + It – Dt.     (4) 
The regulator then determines the Weighted Average Cost of Capital, WACC, to apply to the 
RAB, and includes this in the revenue that the utility can recover (Capex) in addition to 
operating costs (Opex). 
Price controls are normally for five years (a recent experiment to set an eight-year 
term was considered too long). The utility submits its business plan setting out its evolution 
of Opex and its investment plan, It. The regulator can (and does) benchmark the opex against 
comparable utilities (easy when there are 14 distribution network companies, hard when there 
is a single transmission company), and sets two critical parameters, P0 and X. The initial level 
of the price control, P0, will be set based on the revised business plan that the regulator finally 
accepts after inviting consultants to pore over it. X is set to gradually catch up with the 
frontier (most efficient) comparator. 
With a price cap, all the cost reductions relative to expectations accrue to the utility 
until clawed back at the next price control, providing strong incentives to cut costs. This 
incentive to cut costs must not be at the expense of reduced quality or reliability, so a large 
part of this form of incentive regulation is to set and monitor service standards with penalties 
for breaches, such as interruptions to service. 
18 
 
DB\WD\Elechandbook  
 
This form of regulation has worked reasonably well in driving down costs and has 
improved reliability and quality, although utilities have earned more than the WACC and 
typically invested less than their business planned investment. Ajayi et al. (2018) look at 27 
years of regulatory experience of the electricity networks since privatization in 1990-91. 
They find a total factor productivity growth in distribution networks of about 1% p.a. (higher 
before the financial crisis of 2008, negative after) and a worse performance for transmission 
(in both cases ignoring the value of the quality improvement). They suspect that low 
productivity reflects government objectives of increased renewables that will have raised 
investment needs without increasing conventional measure of network outputs. 
 
 
Figure 8 The game between the utility and regulator in submitting business plans 
Figure 8 shows the early experience of the distribution network utilities, where they 
submitted forecasts of their planned investment (Pollitt and Dale, 2018, give more up-to-date 
investment data). The regulator revised these down, and then the utilities outperformed (or 
succeeded in misleading the regulator). The problem is that the main cost of networks lies in 
enhancing and maintaining its capital, but there is no obvious benchmark for efficient 
investment. It is difficult to measure the current state of the assets and what upgrades, 
replacements or extensions are justified in each different region. Various attempts have been 
made to reduce the information asymmetry between utility and regulator, and to subject 
investment to similar incentives as opex. In 2010, 20 years after RPI-X in the energy sector, 
Ofgem introduced RIIO, short for Revenue = Incentives + Innovation + Outputs. Opex and 
Capex are combined into Totex, and subject to incentive regulation, with innovation now 
playing an important role as explained in the next section. 
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6.1 Ofgem’s Network Innovation Competitions 
A regulated utility has little incentive to innovate, as if it succeeds in reducing cost, the 
regulator will likely reduce prices at the next price control, whereas if it fails, the cost of the 
innovation will be deemed unjustified and hence not compensated. To counter this, Ofgem 
first introduced its Low Carbon Network Fund (LCNF) for electricity network companies, 
and then extended this to Gas and Electricity Network Innovation Competitions. The original 
LCNF sum of up to £500 million for the period 1 April 2010 to 31 March 2015 was financed 
by a levy on consumers, and had to offer the prospect of reducing future consumer bills by 
more than this sum. Ofgem commissioned Pöyry (2016) to evaluate the programme.23 Pöyry 
concluded that “the potential future net-benefit from the LCNF projects is significant and is 
estimated to range from 4.5 to 6.5 times the cost of funding the scheme.” The benefits are 
passed on to consumers by setting future price controls for network utilities on the 
assumption that they will adopt proven better value solutions identified by these 
competitions. One of the main benefits has been to embed an innovative culture in the 
management of these utilities, whose professional pride depends on winning projects in the 
annual competition. 
 
6.2 Tariff setting 
Tariffs are important in guiding efficient location and use decisions, as transmission and 
distribution tariffs make up 25% of the domestic bill, compared to just 33% for the wholesale 
electricity cost.24 Ideally they should be fair, efficient and cost-reflective — aims that can 
conflict. The variable or short-run marginal cost (SRMC) of using a network is either almost 
zero or a scarcity price if the network is fully used (which is rarely the case). The efficient 
price is as in equation (1), the sum of the SRMC and a capacity or scarcity payment that will 
be zero most of the time. The private owners need to receive the average cost, far above the 
SRMC. The shortfall in revenue is akin a tax, for which public economics lays out good 
design principles. Ramsey/Boiteux pricing argues that this shortfall in revenue or tax should 
be concentrated on the least elastic demands, e.g. through a fixed charge for access. More 
exactly, the mark-up on SRMC should lead to equal proportionate reductions in all uses. Peak 
demand pricing if there is scarcity is the first element, then charging for access or capacity 
rather than use follows next. The tension is that the results may not be considered fair or 
equitable, but this can be addressed with multi-part tariffs. For low demands, a mark-up on 
the energy cost can be added, which, once it reaches a level that covers a suitable fixed cost, 
can be replaced by a two-part tariff with a fixed and variable (energy) charge. 
Domestic energy bills have a very low fixed charge and quite a high energy mark-up, 
which over-encourages self-production (and efficiency, that if mis-perceived, may correct a 
behavioural bias). Industrial and large customers pay a Triad charge, levied on the three 
system-peak half hours (separated by 10 days), an apparently closer approximation to an 
efficient charge. The main distortion is that distribution companies pay this to the 
transmission company at their off-take point, and until recently compensated those who 
supplied electricity to the distribution network at the avoided Transmission Use of System 
                                                 
23 Ofgem (2016) reviews the results of, and learning from, the supported projects in detail. 
24 https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/data-portal/breakdown-electricity-bill  
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Charge. This massively distorted location decisions for new capacity bidding into the 
capacity auction, as described above. Ofgem finally reformed this “embedded benefit” in 
2017.25 
 
7. New Nuclear – the financing problem 
Taylor (2016) charts the sorry development of British Energy under private ownership. The 
collapse of electricity prices precipitated by an outbreak of competition in an over-supplied 
market that pushed the company into insolvency in Dec 2002 when it failed to renegotiate its 
reprocessing contracts with the state-owned BNFL. The then Labour Government had 
members actively hostile to nuclear power, but others who recognized that to address climate 
change post-Kyoto would require active decarbonisation of electricity. Replacing aging 
nuclear stations with gas would raise emissions, exactly the wrong direction. After a series of 
reports on nuclear power from 2003-2008 (documented in Taylor, 2016), the Labour 
Government published a White Paper (BERR, 2008). Combined with the Climate Change Act 
2008 (HoC, 2008) this paved the way for active Government support for new nuclear plants. 
At the same time the Government was trying to sell British Energy, a sale finally completed 
in early 2009 to EdF, the (largely) state-owned French nuclear power company. 
The first new nuclear project to be considered under this new regime was Hinkley 
Point C, which had been actively considered as the next PWR station under the CEGB in the 
1980s. (The first, Sizwell B, was finally commissioned after privatization in 1995.) EdF 
started public consultations in 2008 and finally signed a contract with the Government in 
October 2013 for a stated cost of £16 bn, or £10 million/MW, a record. Taylor (2016, p167) 
notes that the EC state aid approval document estimated the maximum full cost with 
financing and contingencies as £24 billion, or 50% more. The cost was high partly as none of 
the same EPR design under construction were anywhere near completion and had huge cost 
over-runs, and partly as the Government insisted that all the construction risk lay with the 
private company. That is about the most expensive form of risk sharing imaginable (as the 
National Audit Office then made clear; NAO, 2017). The project was to be financed by a CfD 
lasting 35 years at a strike price of £(2013) 92.50/MWh. That might have seemed reasonable 
compared to renewables at the time, but was more than twice the cost of the last round of 
auctioned off-shore wind. 
It gradually became clearer to everyone that this was not the right way to finance new 
nuclear power. Many took the view that it was an argument against financing any new 
nuclear power. No private company has ever successfully completed a nuclear power station 
without substantial government or regulatory financial guarantees. HPC is no exception, only 
unusual in the amount of risk placed on the private utility. The most recent assessment by the 
National Infrastructure Commission in 2018 was to not “agree support for more than one 
nuclear power station beyond Hinkley Point C, before 2025.”26 The argument is that by 2025 
                                                 
25 At https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/embedded-benefits-impact-assessment-
and-decision-industry-proposals-cmp264-and-cmp265-change-electricity-transmission-charging-
arrangements-embedded-generators. Ofgem launched a Targeted Charging Review in Aug 2017 to 
examine a wider range of tariff design issues (at https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-
updates/targeted-charging-review-significant-code-review-launch). 
26 At https://www.nic.org.uk/assessment/national-infrastructure-assessment/low-cost-low-carbon/  
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the cost of a second (and possibly subsequent) stations should be clearer. There was no 
reason to rush ahead until the cheapest (full system) cost of zero carbon electricity had been 
more robustly identified. Since that report Toshiba has scrapped its plans for a new nuclear 
station in Cumbria after spending £125 million,27 while Hitachi is considering pulling out of 
its new nuclear power plant at Wylfa Newydd (North Wales) although the BBC News on 15 
Jan 2019 reported that it “is more likely to put it on hold rather than scrap it completely”. 
EdF has proposed that the next station should be an almost exact replica of HPC at 
Sizewell, and that it should be financed by a Regulatory Asset Based (RAB) model described 
above. This is standard for utilities like water and transmission companies, in which the RAB 
is  rolled forward by adding an agreed flow of investments (and decreased by depreciation of 
the assets). The finance is made available in line with investment expenditure and a return on 
the RAB is paid to investors. This allows access to low-cost finance from pension funds. It 
avoids the uncertainty about when returns will be paid given the uncertain date of future 
commissioning, as with HPC. As with other utilities, the allowed investment would be agreed 
in advance with an oversight authority (e.g. the Low Carbon Contracts Company28 that acts 
as counterparty to renewable CfDs). As with other utility investments, incentives in the form 
of cost or profit sharing with consumers of any cost over- or under-runs would reduce risk 
and hence lower the cost of capital. Sharing risk over a large number of consumers rather 
than concentrating it on one company where the asset would be a very large fraction of its 
market worth would reduce the cost of that risk. 
The other model would be for the Government to take the construction risk on balance 
sheet (as with large transport projects like CrossRail or High Speed 2) and finance it a low 
cost public sector interest rates, as was standard for the previously nationalised energy 
companies. The choice between the two models depends on a balance between the public 
sector’s lower cost of finance compared with the remarkably low rates now achieved for 
RAB financing of other infrastructure projects like the Thames Tideway Tunnel, and the 
possibility that project management and financial control are better handled by a private 
company with current experience of building an all-but identical project. The objection that it 
would add to Public Debt is spurious, as the IMF (2018) argues that it is the net wealth 
(assets less liabilities) that matter, not just one side of the balance sheet. Good investments 
strengthen, not weaken, net wealth. 
 
8 Reflections 
The British privatised electricity system is now 30 years old and a good moment to take stock 
of its successes and weaknesses. The premise of privatization was that private owners would 
invest and operate more efficiently than state-owned enterprises, and that by escaping the 
dead hand of ministries of finance (the Treasury in the UK case) they would have access to 
more investment funds, would choose more cost-effective investments, and would, through 
board-level and shareholder scrutiny, cease unprofitable activities sooner and respond to new 
opportunities more quickly. These potential benefits would have to be weighed against the 
                                                 
27 See https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/nov/08/toshiba-uk-nuclear-power-plant-
project-nu-gen-cumbria  
28 See https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/contracts-for-difference/contract-for-difference  
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increased cost of private capital, and a possible loss of concern over distributional issues and 
environmental impacts, unless motivated to take them into account. 
Avner Offer (2018) has pointed out that the private sector is well placed to invest 
where the credit time horizon is attractive to private lenders, defined as the time to pay back 
the loan. Roughly speaking, private finance is twice the cost of public finance, so the private 
pay-back period (simply computed) is half that of the government. Government guarantees or 
their regulatory equivalent (such as the US model of rate-of-return regulation underpinned by 
a Constitutionally backed rule of law) can offer reassurances, lower the cost of capital and 
extend this credit horizon. Offer points out that as telecoms land lines may last a century they 
required state-ownership or regulated monopolies to undertake the investment. Mobile 
telephony has equipment that may be replaced in less than a decade, lending itself to private 
ownership. 
The British electricity supply industry in 1989 was well placed to reap many of the 
benefits of private ownership, and initially, to avoid many of the downside costs.29 Spare 
capacity avoided the need for costly durable generating capacity and the risk of an 
inappropriate credit time horizon. The arrival of cheap CCGTs of modest scale, rapid 
delivery and high efficiency, at a time of falling gas prices, made any such investments lower 
risk. Even then, such investments needed long-term PPA contracts and a captive franchise 
market. The more capital-intensive and durable networks were assured of financeability 
through licence conditions, obligations on the regulator and a credible dispute resolution 
process. The RAB form of asset regulation arguably improved on the US model of utility 
regulation (Gilbert and Newbery, 1994 ). Distributional concerns emerged, and were, with 
varying degrees of success, met with licence conditions on utilities, low (and distorting) rates 
of VAT on energy, political pressure on the regulator, Competition and Market Authority 
inquiries (CMA, 2016), and price caps. Environmental concerns were met with increasingly 
stringent emissions standards on pollutants, the ETS, various EU Directives, and in GB, the 
Carbon Price Support. 
Problems emerged when new capital-intensive generation investment was needed, 
both to meet carbon and renewables targets, and to maintain reliability. The ideology of the 
market initially led to auctions for renewables that were remarkably effective at driving down 
costs, less so at delivering adequate volumes. The shift to the Renewables Obligation pulled 
through more delivery but at a high cost of finance. It took over 20 years to learn from 
experience elsewhere that long-term contracts at assured off-take prices would lower the cost 
of capital and with it the delivered cost of renewable electricity. 
Nuclear Power and Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) demonstrated the force of 
Offer’s credit time horizon. No nuclear power station has ever been constructed without 
strong and credible underwriting from either the government or a utility empowered to pass 
the cost through to final consumers.  Even that model came off the rails in the US after the oil 
shocks of the 1970s raised inflation and electricity costs. Rate reviews are needed when 
utility rates need raising. That requires utility commissions to scrutinise costs and investment 
plans to ensure they are “just and reasonable”. The Washington Public Power Supply System, 
aptly named Whoops, had started on one nuclear plant and had plans for four more, with two 
                                                 
29 Pollitt (2012) discusses the wider lessons from electricity liberalisation. 
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units starting in 1977. WPPSS has the right to issue tax-favoured municipal bonds to finance 
investments without voter approval, but a voter initiative in 1981 denied WPPSS the right to 
issue more bonds. Construction was suspended and eventually only the first reactor was ever 
completed.30 
In Britain, as described above, Hinkley Point C has staggered on since before 
privatization, and only (just) secured its Final Investment Decision after one of the most 
costly financing arrangements with government guarantees was struck. Given a possible 
construction period of ten years and a subsequent life of 60 years, followed by possibly 
centuries of waste management, nuclear power busts Offer’s credit time horizon 
comprehensively. CCS has had an even worse experience, with over a decade of unfulfilled 
promises to deliver a commercial-scale plant. Even conventional CCGTs now need 15-year 
capacity payments to encourage investment, so that to a greater or lesser extent all new 
generation now receives under-written guarantees by the Government.  
Critics (e.g. Darwell, 2015) argue that this reflects a betrayal of the original aims of 
privatization, while realists (and very belatedly and to a limited extent, the Government) 
argue that durable essential infrastructure like electricity needs access to low-cost finance that 
only government-backed or guaranteed finance can assure.31 Perhaps the most useful lesson 
from privatizing utilities is that the UK has evolved a system of regulating at least part of the 
infrastructure (the natural monopoly pipes and wires) that works reasonably well and has 
delivered high levels of investment at modest rates of interest. It would be encouraging to 
think that the UK can continue to learn how better to finance the necessary capital-intensive 
zero carbon energy to meet our climate goals in a timely fashion. 
 
  
                                                 
30  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WNP-3_and_WNP-5  
31 One of the major failings of the post-Thatcher civil service is its declining ability to attract and 
retain the brightest and best, coupled with excessive rates of staff turnover that makes learning from 
the past and reaching informed financial decisions increasingly difficult (Sasse and Norris, 2019). 
24 
 
DB\WD\Elechandbook  
 
References 
Ajayi, V., K. Anaya and M. Pollitt, 2018. Productivity growth in electricity and gas networks since 
1990: Report prepared for the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM), at 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/system/files/docs/2019/01/ofgem_productivity_report_dec_2018_
1.pdf  
Allaz, B. and Vila, J-L., 1993. Cournot competition, forward markets and efficiency, J. Ec. Theory 59, 
1-16  
Armstrong, M., S. Cowan and J. Vickers, 1994. Regulatory Reform - Economic Analysis and British 
Experience, Cambridge:  MIT Press 
Bates, R., Fraser, N., 1974. Investment Decisions in the Nationalised Fuel Industries, Cambridge, 
CUP. 
BEIS, (2017). Historical electricity data: 1920 to 2016. Available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/historical-electricity-data-1920-to-2011 . 
BERR, 2008. Meeting the Energy Challenge: A white paper on nuclear power. Cm 7296 at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228944/7296.p
df  
Boiteux, M. (1949). La Tarification des Demandes en Pointe: Application de la Théorie de la Vente 
au Côut Marginal, Revue Générale de l'Electricité.  
Bower, J. (2002). Why did electricity prices fall in England and Wales? Market Mechanism or Market 
Structure? OIES WP El02, at https://www.oxfordenergy.org/publications/why-did-electricity-
prices-fall-in-england-and-wales-market-mechanism-or-market-structure/  
CCC,  2015. Fifth Carbon Budget. Committee on Climate Change, at 
https://www.theccc.org.uk/publication/the-fifth-carbon-budget-the-next-step-towards-a-low-
carbon-economy/  
CMA, 2016. Energy market investigation, Competition and Markets Authority Final Report, 24 June, 
at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5773de34e5274a0da3000113/final-report-
energy-market-investigation.pdf  
Darwell, R., 2015. Central Planning with Market Features: how renewable subsidies destroyed the 
UK electricity market, Centre for Policy Studies, at http://euanmearns.com/renewable-energy-
the-most-expensive-policy-disaster-in-modern-british-history/  
DECC, (2011). Planning our electric future: a White Paper for secure, affordable and low-carbon 
electricity, at 
http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/legislation/white_papers/emr_wp_2011/emr_wp_201
1.aspx .   
DECC (2013). Annex F: EMR Panel of Technical Experts Final Report for DECC. July, at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/223656/emr_c
onsultation_annex_f.pdf.    
DECC, (2014). EMR Panel of Technical Experts Final Report on National Grid’s Electricity Capacity 
Report, at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/252743/Capaci
ty_Market_Impact_Assessment_Oct_2013.pdf  
Domah, P. and Pollitt, M.G. (2001) "Restructuring and privatisation of electricity distribution and 
supply businesses in England and Wales: a social cost-benefit analysis." Fiscal Studies, 22(1): 
107-146 (DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-5890.2001.tb00036.x) 
European Parliament, (2009). Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing 
Directive 2003/54/EC at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32009L0072 .   
European Council (2017). Reform of the EU emissions trading system – Council endorses deal with 
Parliament, Press Release, 22 November. 
Evans, J. and R.J. Green, (2003). Why did electricity prices fall after 1998? CMI WP26, available at 
https://ideas.repec.org/p/ecj/ac2003/92.html  
Gilbert, R.J. and D.M. Newbery (1994) ‘The Dynamic Efficiency of Regulatory Constitutions’, Rand 
Journal of Economics, 25(4), 538-54  
25 
 
DB\WD\Elechandbook  
 
Giulietti, M., L. Grossi and M. Waterson, 2010. Price transmission in the UK electricity 
market: Was NETA beneficial?, Energy Economics, 32(4), 1165-1174. 
Green, R.J. and Newbery, D.M., 1992. Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market. J. Pol. 
Econ. 100(5), 929-53. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2138629 
Grubb, M. and D. Newbery, 2018. UK Electricity Market Reform and the Energy Transition: 
Emerging Lessons. The Energy Journal. Earlier version published as MIT CEEPR WP 2018-
004 and EPRG WP 1817 at https://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/1817-Text.pdf  
Chyong, K., B. Guo and D. Newbery, 2019. The impact of a Carbon Tax on the CO2 emissions 
reduction of wind. EPRG WP 1904 at https://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/category/working-
papers-2019/  
DUKES, various years, Digest of UK Energy Statistics, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/digest-of-uk-energy-statistics-dukes  
Henney, A. (1987). Privatise Power: How to restructure the Electricity Supply Industry, Policy 
Journals, May. 
Henney, A. (1994). A study of the privatisation of the Electricity Supply Industry in England and 
Wales. EEE Ltd.  
Hirth, L., (2018). What cause the drop in European electricity prices? A factor decomposition 
analysis. The Energy Journal, 19(1), 132-157 
HMT, 2011. Budget 2011, Stationary Office, HC 836 at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130105112918/http://cdn.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/2011budget_complete.pdf    
HoC, 2008. Climate Change Act 2008, at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/27/contents  
HoC, 2013. Energy Act 2013, 2013.c.32, at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/32/contents/enacted/data.htm  
IMF, 2018. Managing Public Wealth, Fiscal Monitor October 2018 at 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/FM/Issues/2018/10/04/fiscal-monitor-october-2018  
London Economics, 2013. The Value of Lost Load VoLL for Electricity in Great Britain; Final report 
for OFGEM and DECC, July, at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/224028/value_
lost_load_electricty_gb.pdf  
Meek, R.L. (1968). The New Bulk Supply Tariff for Electricity, The Economic Journal, 78 (309), 43-
66  
Mitchell, C. (2000), The England and Wales Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation: History And Lessons, Annu. 
Rev. Energy Environ. 25: 285–312.  
NAO, 2017. Hinkley Point C, HC: 40, 2017-18, at https://www.nao.org.uk/report/hinkley-point-c/  
National Grid (2014). Electricity Capacity Report, at 
http://www2.nationalgrid.com/UK/Our%20company/Electricity/Market%20Reform/Announc
ements/June%202014%20Auction%20Guidelines%20publication/  
Newbery, D. M., 1995. Power Markets and Market Power. The Energy Journal, 163, 41-66 
Newbery, D. M. (1998) ‘The Regulator’s Review of the English Electricity Pool’, Utilities Policy, 
7(3), 129-41 http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/juipol/v7y1998i3p129-141.html  
Newbery, D.M. (2000), Privatization, Restructuring and Regulation of Network Utilities, (The 
Walras-Pareto Lectures, 1995), MIT Press, 2000, ISBN 0-262-14068-3 
Newbery, D.M., 2005. Electricity liberalisation in Britain: the quest for a satisfactory wholesale 
market design. The Energy Journal, Special Issue on European Electricity Liberalisation, ed. 
D Newbery, 43-70 at http://www.iaee.org/en/publications/speciali.aspx  
Newbery, D.M., 2012. Reforming Competitive Electricity Markets to Meet Environmental Targets. 
Econ. Energy & Envir. Pol. 1(1), 69-82.  
Newbery, D.M. 2016a. Missing Money and Missing Markets: Reliability, Capacity Auctions and 
Interconnectors, Energy Policy, 94, 401–410. Doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2015.10.028  
Newbery, D.M., 2016b. Towards a green energy economy? The EU Energy Union's transition to a 
low-carbon zero subsidy electricity system - lessons from the UK's Electricity Market 
26 
 
DB\WD\Elechandbook  
 
Reform, Applied Energy, 179, 1321–1330. Doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2016.01.046  
Newbery, D.M., 2017. Tales of Two Islands - Lessons for EU Energy Policy from Electricity Market 
Reforms in Britain and Ireland, Energy Policy, 105, 597–607 available online at 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2016.10.015  
Newbery, D.M. and M.G. Pollitt (1997) ‘The Restructuring and Privatisation of the CEGB- Was it 
worth it’, Journal of Industrial Economics, XLV (3), 269-303 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2950471  
Newbery, D.M. and R. Green (1996) ‘Regulation, public ownership and privatisation of the English 
electricity industry’, ch 2, 25-81 in Richard J Gilbert and Edward P Kahn (eds) International 
Comparisons of Electricity Regulation, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996 ISBN: 
0-521-49590-3  
Newbery, D., D. Reiner and R. Ritz, (2018). The political economy of a carbon price floor for power 
generation. The Energy Journal (in press). Also EPRG WP 1816 at 
https://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/eprg-working-paper-1816/ 
https://www.ofwat.gov.uk/consultation/consultation-on-the-regulatory-framework-for-the-
infrastructure-provider-that-will-deliver-the-thames-tideway-tunnel-
project/pap_tec20141007draftguidance/  
Offer, A., 2018. Patient and impatient capital: time horizons as market boundaries, Oxford Discussion 
Papers in Economic and Social History, Number 165, August 2018 
Ofgem, (2010). Project Discovery: Options for delivering secure and sustainable energy supplies. 
February, at https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-
publications/40354/projectdiscoveryfebcondocfinal.pdf . 
Ofgem, 2016. EA technology’s Summary of the Low Carbon Network Fund Learning at 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/ea-technology-s-summary-low-carbon-
network-fund-learning 
Pollitt, M.G. (1998) `The restructuring and privatization of the Electricity Supply Industry in 
Scotland', Cambridge: mimeo, June 
Pollitt, M.G., 2012. The role of policy in energy transitions: Lessons from the energy liberalisation 
era, Energy Policy. 50, 128–137. 
Pollitt, M.G. and L. Dale, 2018. Restructuring the Chinese Electricity Supply Sector - How industrial 
electricity prices are determined in a liberalized power market: lessons from Great Britain, 
EPRG Working Paper 1839 at https://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2018/11/1839-Text.pdf  
Pőyry, 2016. An Independent Evaluation of the LCNF: A report to Ofgem, at 
http://www.poyry.co.uk/ofgem-publishes-poyrys-independent-evaluation-low-carbon-
network-fund  
Sass, T, and  Norris, E., 2019. Moving On - The costs of high staff turnover in the civil service. 
Institute for Government, at https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publications/moving-
on-staff-turnover-civil-
service?inf_contact_key=8846f4a954b5997853d299be93499e758ecc59848a11ab5d044ad912
ef17bc52  
Sweeting, A., 2007. Market Power in the England and Wales Wholesale Electricity Market 1995–
2000. The Econ. J., 117: 654–685. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02045  
Taylor, S. (2007) Privatization and financial collapse in the nuclear industry - the origins and causes 
of the British Energy crisis of 2002. London: Routledge.  
Taylor, S., 2016. The Fall and Rise of Nuclear Power in Britain; A history. UIT Cambridge  
Zachary, S. and A. Wilson, 2015. Robustness of reliability measures, mimeo, Durham University, Dec 
19. 
  
27 
 
DB\WD\Elechandbook  
 
Source of figures 
Fig 1: Elec\Dukes\DUKES_5.1_2017  to update 
Fig 2: Elec\England & Wales Power stations (2005) 
Fig 3: Elec\NETA\RGPool to update 
Fig 4: Elec\NETA\Gen\DUKES_5.10  
Fig. 5 Environ\EUA price 
Fig.6: Interconnectors\import 
Fig. 7: Elec\Europe\RES generation 
Fig. 8: Elec\Retail\GBRECInvest 
